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CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE HOLMES, AND
THE DISCOURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
G. EDWARD WHITE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay is precipitated by the presence of a potentially new
stage of public discourse about Justices of the United States Supreme Court. The appearance of this stage is suggested by the recent nominations of Robert Bork and Anthony Kennedy, and, in
particular, one feature of their confirmation proceedings. The feature to which I refer is the collapse, in both nominations, of an
established justification for presidential choices of given nominees.
Established since Franklin Roosevelt's initial nominations, that
justification can be stated, in lay terms, as follows. The President
can name whomever he1 wants, so long as the nominee is professionally qualified; the ideological politics of the nominee are irrelevant. After all, the justification suggests, the President himself
holds partisan ideological views, why can't the nominee? I will call
this justification "presidential prerogative."
An implicit corollary to the presidential prerogative justification
also exists. Although the President may name ideological partisans,
the nominee must disclaim his or her partisanship in the confirmation process. This corollary was in evidence in the nomination
hearings of William Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia to be Associate
Justices. Both men, at the time of their nominations, were known
political "conservatives" and were known to be acceptable to the
Presidents who nominated them in part because of those views.
Nevertheless, the nominees stated repeatedly that their ideological
inclinations and their partisan affiliations would be irrelevant in
* John B. Minor Professor of Law & History, University of Virginia. B.A., Amherst College, 1963; Ph.D., Yale, 1967; J.D., Harvard, 1970. This essay is a revised version of the
twelfth George Wythe Lecture, delivered at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary, on March 31, 1988. My thanks to Karen Schools for her help with the
revisions.

1. "She" would be misleading as applied to Presidents from Roosevelt through Reagan.
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their interpretations of the Constitution.2 Rehnquist and Scalia
were by no means unique in these disclaimers: Thurgood Marshall
made them as well in his confirmation hearings.'
The established justification of presidential prerogative was advanced in Bork's nomination proceedings as well. Bork, too, eventually offered a version of the nominee disclaimer corollary.4 Yet,
in Bork's confirmation proceedings, the justification collapsed.
Bork abandoned the corollary and stated forthrightly his substantive views. Moreover, in Kennedy's confirmation proceedings, the
presidential prerogative justification was stated in very muted
terms. Kennedy did not so much disclaim his ideological orientations as intimate that his orientations were politically "moderate,"
that is, much less right of center than those of Bork.5
I am not, at this point in the essay, addressing the question of
whether the apparent collapse of the prerogative justification, and
the attendant diminution of the significance of the nominee disclaimer corollary, mark a laudable development in the history of
the process of nominating Supreme Court Justices. I am merely
assuming that the Bork and Kennedy nominations may have
marked the beginning of a new stage in the discourse of commentary about the proper role for Justices of the Supreme Court, and
am seeking to explore the origins of that stage.
In that exploration I turn first to history, and seek to examine
the discourse of commentary about the proper role for Supreme
Court Justices over time. I find, in the history of that discourse,
two idealized postures for Supreme Court Justices in constitutional
adjudication. These postures, I will argue, have established the
boundaries of discourse; they represent the polar opposites of an

2. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
37-38, 43-44, 59, 84 (1986); Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist, of Arizona, to
be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess. 155, 175, 204 (1971).
3. Nomination of Thurgood Marshall of New York, to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, 93, 158-61 (1967).
4. See A War of Words: Nominee Denies Kennedy's Charges, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987,
at A10, col. 5.
5. See Judge Kennedy Says Rights Are Not Always Spelled Out, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15,
1987, at B16, col. 1.
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ongoing debate about the proper role of the Court in constitutional
adjudication. The two postures are the Marshallian posture, identified with Chief Justice Marshall, and the Holmesian posture, identified with Justice Holmes. I will explore the origins and evolution
of the postures and their dialectical interaction over time. I will
ultimately return to the Bork and Kennedy nominations with that
exploration in mind, and at that point my comments will have an
explicitly normative dimension.
At this juncture, a preliminary comment on what I mean by
"Marshallian" and "Hoimesian" postures for Supreme Court Justices seems in order. The postures are being employed as ideal
types: I am not suggesting that they represent precise characterizations of the jurisprudential views of Chief Justice Marshall and
Justice Holmes in every constitutional case they respectively decided. An example may clarify the distinction I have in mind. I will
characterize the Holmesian posture as incorporating an attitude
toward the sources of rights in American jurisprudence (either natural or constitutional) that rejects a conception of rights as having
any meaningful content apart from positivistic legislation. In constitutional adjudication, rights are based, for a Holmesian, on enacted legislation or on the text of the Constitution, not on anything
prior to or independent of those entities.
Yet in PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon$Holmes did not seem to
hold such an attitude toward rights. The case tested the constitutionality of a state legislature's restriction on "vested" property
rights. At issue were the rights of subsurface mine owners to maintain mineral rights in their land once they had conveyed the surface of that land to other private parties, expressly retaining their
subsurface rights. The mine owners argued that a Pennsylvania
statute7 that forbade them from reasserting their subsurface rights
was unconstitutional in several respects.8 They asserted that it violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, 9 the fifth
amendment's takings clause10 as incorporated in the fourteenth

6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
7. The statute at issue was the Kohler Act. See id.
8. Id. at 412.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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amendment,11 and the contracts clause,12 which precludes states
from "impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
Holmes, for the Court, held the statute unconstitutional. He argued that "the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing
rights of property and contract,"'1 3 that "the implied limitation [of
the police power of the state in eminent domain cases] must have
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone,"1 " and
that "[t]he general rule . . . is . . . that while property may be

regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." 15 Although Holmes may have treated all of
the vested property and contract rights he protected in Mahon as
derived from some positivistic source, a more reasonable reading of
his opinion is that it is not entirely consistent with a "Holmesian"
posture toward the sources of rights. That posture, therefore, is not
the equivalent of Holmes' actual stance in every case he decided,
although it represents a fair extrapolation of his stance in the great
majority of his decisions.
II. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE MARSHALLIAN AND
HOLMESIAN POSTURES
As employed in this essay, the Marshallian and Holmesian pos-

tures represent contrasting attitudes toward four fundamental jurisprudential issues: 1) the sources of individual rights in American
jurisprudence, 2) the relationship between individual rights and
the state, 3) the Constitution's role in that relationship, and 4) the
respective roles of legislatures and the United States Supreme
Court in that relationship. My characterization of the postures assumes not only that their respective attitudes toward these four
issues are in diametrical opposition, but also that the issues themselves have remained, over time, at the core of discourse about the
role of Supreme Court Justices in constitutional adjudication.
11. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment's "just compensation" requirement for constitutional takings was applicable to state eminent domain statutes, of which the Kohler Act was
one. See id. at 241.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
13. 260 U.S. at 413.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 415.
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A Marshalian posture treats individual rights as natural and inalienable, existing prior to the formation of the state. Marshalians
characterize the state as functioning not only to secure and preserve pre-existing rights, but also to ensure that pre-existing rights
are exercised and protected through positive law. For a Marshallian, the Constitution is the paramount positive source of law in
America. It is designed to preserve, promote, and defend the
proper relationship between individual rights and the state and is
presumptively supreme over all other positive sources of law. But
the Constitution is not the exclusive source of individual rights;
other extratextual natural rights retain their intelligibility and significance. Finally, for a Marshallian, the positive enactments of
state or federal legislatures, when they restrict individual rights,
are suspect because legislatures are potentially demagogic and corrupt. In sum, for Marshallians, the proper role of the Supreme
Court in constitutional adjudication is to maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution and to protect individual rights, whether they
rights or "vested" rights derived from preare pre-existing natural
16
existing positive law.

In contrast, a Holmesian posture treats rights as solely the product of positive laws enacted by the state. Natural and inalienable
rights do not exist, either in the sense of being philosophically intelligible or in the sense of being practically significant. Being the
creation of the state, rights are subordinate to its dictates, which
are themselves the result of majoritarian preferences. Individual
rights, whatever their nature or content, must yield to the majority. The recourse of disappointed individuals whose rights are being restricted is to facilitate revolution so that they become members of a new majority. Although the Constitution is a paramount
source of law, because it is a positive enactment, it has a very limited substantive meaning when it restricts majoritarian preferences. The constitutional text, for Holmesians, restricts legislative
activity only when a "clear mandate" exists in the words of the
text; needless to say, the text does not implicitly incorporate natu16. For support for the generalizations advanced in this paragraph, see R. FAULKNER, THE
59-63, 69-79, 195-223, 227-68 (1968); G.E. WHITE, The

JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN4 MARSHALL

MarshallCourt and CulturalChange, 1815-35, in 3-4 THs OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 512-35, 541-52, 563-80, 595-656
(1988).
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ral extratextual rights. Finally, Holmesians believe that Supreme
Court Justices should give great weight to the positive enactments
of legislatures in interpreting the Constitution, even when the positive law restricts individual rights, because legislatures are the primary institutional embodiment of the majority's will.17
As a shorthand summary, one could characterize the opposition
between the postures as a familiar precept of constitutional commentary: the "countermajoritarian difficulty" that Alexander
Bickel once claimed followed from "the essential reality that judicial review [as practiced by the Supreme Court in constitutional
cases] is a deviant institution in the American democracy. "' 18 Marshall's Constitution is a countermajoritarian document, and the
Supreme Court is a countermajoritarian force. Holmes's Constitution is one in which the Court constantly must consider the fact
that the Court is not a democratic institution and that the attendant "countermajoritarian difficulty" exists.
I now turn to a brief and necessarily sketchy overview of the
origins and interaction of the two postures in American constitutional history. The Marshallian posture was originally a product of
a premodern jurisprudence, one in which a certain set of substantive values-protection of property, the importance of civic responsibility, a hierarchical ordering of status relationships-were taken
for granted by elites as permanent features of society. Those values
formed the basis of all of the assumptions I have associated with
Marshallians.' 9 By contrast, the Holmesian posture originated in
modernism; it began with the premise that any deep societal consensus on substantive values was necessarily impermanent and
17. For support for the generalizations advanced in this paragraph, see H.L. POHLMAN,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984); Gordon, Holmes'

Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 723-27, 734-36, 742-44
(1982); Rogat, The Judge as Spectator,31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 225-26, 249-55 (1964); White,
The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 652, 655-58, 663-71
(1982); White, Looking at Holmes in the Mirror, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 447-48, 451-55,
464-65 (1986). See also R. FAULKNER, supra note 16, at 227-68, for an effort to compare
Marshall's and Holmes's jurisprudence.
18. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (2d ed. 1986). Bickel may have coined
the phrase, but he by no means exhausted the concept. For an extensive summary of the
considerable literature on the "countermajoritarian difficulty," see P. BREST & S. LEVINSON,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 889-901 (2d ed. 1983), and sources cited
therein.
19. See G.E. WHITE, supra note 16, at 595-656, and sources cited therein.
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problematic. As modernists, Holmesians posit that humans cannot
affirm reflexively the universality and permanence of substantive
values. According to Holmes, all that one can affirm is that some
values for which many individuals in a culture might die exist. For
Holmesians, the primacy of values is determined not by their inherent rightness but by their affirmation by majorities. In other
words, the best test of the truth of an idea is its power in the marketplace of ideas. 0
The above analysis might suggest that, because we are now all
modernists, the Holmesian view has prevailed. Furthermore, although some commentators seem bent on resurrecting a conception
of property rights as absolute, inalienable, and permanent2 1 and
others wax enthusiastic about the virtues of republicanism, 2 2 the
discourse of contemporary commentary remains seemingly embounded by modernist eschatology. 23 Yet at the very time that the
Holmesian posture, which Holmes first articulated impressively in
Lochner v. New York, 24 became orthodoxy in the early 1930s, 2 5 a

20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See H.L.
supra note 17, at 13-15, 81, 96-97, 141-43; M.G. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN
AMERIcA THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 59-75, 103-06 (2d ed. 1957); Special Issue: Modernist Culture in America, 39 Am.Q. 1 (1987); White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes,
39 U. CH. L. REv. 51, 65-67, 75-77 (1971).
21. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, EcONOMic LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTrUTION (1980).
22. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
23. See generally Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tsx. L. REv. 373 (1982). See also the
exchange between Owen M. Fiss and Paul Brest in Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34
STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982), and Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765
(1982).
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The adverb "impressively" is precipitated
by Holmes's earlier opinion in Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903), which contained the
following passage:
While the courts must exercise a judgment of their own, it by no means is true
that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with
which they disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of
view as well as for possible peculiar conditions which this court can know but
imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or
economical opinions ....
Id. at 608-09.
25. Examples of the establishment of the Holmesian perspective as orthodoxy in the early
POHLMAN,

1930s abound. See, e.g., J. FRANK,

LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

253 (1930) (describing
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deep chasm began to emerge in modernist thought. Over the next
fifty years that chasm has persisted and widened, despite impressive efforts to straddle it or to pretend it did not exist. The chasm
has had a dramatic evolution in constitutional law. It began with a
crack in the surface of Holmesian orthodoxy: the free speech cases
in the late 1920s and 30s.26 It widened as modernism became
linked to totalitarianism in the late 1930s and during the Second
World War,27 and the recognition of its existence precipitated the
emergence of new versions of the Holmesian perspective in the
1950s. s The chasm deepened and widened more during the dominant years of the Warren Court,29 and it has served as the starting
point for a variety of recent efforts to resolve the "countermajoritarian difficulty."30
Holmes as "the completely adult jurist"); F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1938); Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 485 (1935).
26. See the "preferred position" cases, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927).
27. The attacks on Holmes and the revival of "natural law" in the 1940s are now a familiar part of constitutional literature. See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 16768 (1973); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 583-84, 715-16 (1978); White, The
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticismand Social Change, 59 VA. L.
REV. 279, 282-84 (1973); White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHL L. REV. 51,
65-68 (1971).
28. See the exchange between Mark DeWolfe Howe and Henry Hart in Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1951); Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An
Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REV. 929 (1951). See L. FULLER, THE ANATOMY OF LAW (1968); see
also White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration, supra note 27; see generally Ackerman, Book Review, 103 DAEDALUS 199 (Winter 1974) (noting the connections between the
1930s Holmesians and the "Legal Process School").
29. See the exchange between Henry Hart, Thurman Arnold, and Erwin Griswold, in
Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,73 HARV.
L. REV. 84 (1959); Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1298 (1960); Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term-Foreword:Of Time and Attitudes-ProfessorHart
and Judge Arnold, 74 HARv. L. REV. 81 (1960). See also the exchange precipitated by Herbert Wechsler's article, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Finally, see the affirmative defense of the Warren Court's neo-Marshallian perspective in Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L.
REV. 3 (1970), and CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
30. The efforts begin with A- BICKEL, supra note 18, at 16-23, and extend through Black,
supra note 29, to L. TRIBE, supra note 27. See also P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE. THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); J.H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITI-
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The cause of the chasm, of course, was a renewed consciousness
of the potential primacy of substantive rights, even in a modernist
age. But needless to say, the content of the rights elevated to
prominence after the 1930s differed from the content of the rights
elevated by Marshall's contemporaries. Moreover, the rights consciousness of twentieth-century jurisprudence differs from that of
Marshall's time in its assumption that contemporary American
culture is a far more diverse and heterogeneous configuration than
that in which Marshalian jurisprudence was formulated. 1
A few cases illustrate the history sketched above. First are the
"vested rights" decisions of the Marshall Court themselves: decisions such as Fletcher v. Peck,3 2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 3 and Ogden v. Saunders.4 Few contemporary commenta-

tors spend time with those cases, but they are rich illustrations of
the assumptions of Marshallian jurisprudence.3 Almost all of the
Marshalian assumptions are still present as late as 1905 in the ma-

jority opinion in Lochner v. New York,

6

although the substantive

rights being cited have shifted from "property" to "contract," and

CAL PROCESS (1980); R.M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).

31. Cross-cultural comparisons are of course treacherous, and some additional clarification of this statement seems necessary. To compare factors such as "diversity" and "heterogeneity" in any absolute fashion across time is very difficult, although social historians routinely attempt to do so. Marshall's world may have in fact been far less demographically and
ideologically "diverse" than ours, but "diversity" is itself an ideological label that seems
capable of being used only in a relative sense. It seems clear, however, that modernist commentators perceive contemporary American culture to be more demographically and ideologically diverse than America of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I have
argued, in G.E. WHITE, supra note 16, that Marshall and his contemporaries also perceived
their culture as rapidly diversifying and changing, and that such a perception can be observed in the jurisprudential orientation of the Marshall Court. Indeed, the most identifiable feature of Marshall Court jurisprudence, I have argued, was the affirmation of a substantive value consensus in the face of and as a response to perceived change. In short,
despite the overwhelming differences between premoderns and modems, our current debates in the area of constitutional commentary are more reminiscent of those of Marshall
and his contemporaries than we might first suspect.
32. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
34. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
35. Fletcher, for example, exhibits simultaneously an assumed primacy and priority for
private property rights, hostility toward legislatures, an extratextual theory of constitutional
interpretation, and an implicit conception of the judiciary as a countermajoritarian force.
36. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the explicit reliance on extratextual sources has been abandoned."7
In Lochner, substantive rights against the state are taken for
granted. The state is assumed to be in existence to protect, not to
restrict, those rights, legislatures are viewed with suspicion, the judiciary is conceived as a bulwark in defense of private rights, and
the Constitution remains resolutely countermajoritarian. The
Lochner majority opinion is both the culmination and a caricature
of the original Marshallian posture.
The sense in which Lochner is a caricature is captured vividly in
Holmes's dissent. He disclaims any substantive opposition to the
majority's position; he is embracing neither paternalism nor laissez
faire. 8 But his characterization of the Constitution as "made for
people of fundamentally differing views," 9 is itself substantive: his
Constitution is majoritarian and pluralist. The Lochner majority
opinion is made out to be a caricature because its elevation of "liberty of contract" as a primary substantive value is jarringly out of
sync with modernism. Liberty of contract is merely a "dogma";"
dogmas have no place in the sophisticated intellectual universe of
the early twentieth century. With Holmes's challenge to Lochner,
the (now ludicrously inappropriate) strictures of premodernism become clearly exposed.
The Holmesian posture next gathers momentum, becomes orthodoxy, and begins to crack, as previously discussed. The next signif41 In
icant case in the history is Brown v. Board of Education.
Brown, as recent history has demonstrated, the Holmesian posture
invites judicial abdication. Congress has not acted with respect to
the question of racial segregation and the segregationist states
have acted, the latter action based on majoritarian preferences emanating from a particularistic sociology. Although one can argue
that segregation, like slavery, is inconsistent with the values of lib37. Compare Fletcher's reliance on "general principles which are common to our free institutions," 10 U.S. at 139, with Lochner's reliance on "liberty of contract as well as of
person," 198 U.S. at 61. The distinction has not been regarded as insignificant, but it can be
seen as one without a difference.
38. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to
the State or of laissez faire").
39. Id. at 76.
40. Id. at 75.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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erty and equality and is deeply racist, it is also a majoritarian practice. Absent the overwhelming constitutional mandate, "separate
but equal" facilities satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause and the Supreme Court should defer to legislative
majorities.
It may seem incredible to us that this Holmesian argument was
taken seriously at the time Brown was decided. Yet it was. The
crucial problem for the Court in Brown was not, as commentators
have sometimes suggested,4 2 the enforcement of the Brown decree;
the crucial problem was justifying the Court's intervention to
change equal protection jurisprudence in segregation cases in the
face of both southern preferences and congressional inaction. That
was the problem identified both within the Court, prominently by
Jackson and Frankfurter, 3 and by commentators." In response,
the Court in Brown said, in effect, that when certain rights are implicated, the Constitution insists on more than judicial deference
to majority preferences. When those preferences themselves
amount to the denial of substantive rights against the state, specifically, in the case of segregation, rights to equal educational opportunities regardless of race or skin color, the Constitution mandates
that such rights be protected. Brown represents, therefore, the
clear emergence of what can be called a neo-Marshallian posture.45
The next significant case in the history is the revival of the
Lochner majority's position in Griswold v. Connecticut.46 Justice
Douglas announced in Griswold that "[o]vertones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v.New York should be our guide. But
we decline that invitation. 4 7 The "invitation" to which he referred
was an argument that the Warren Court should do for privacy

42. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 712-14 (11th ed. 1985).

43. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 576-77, 596-610 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
45. One could attempt to argue that Brown is not inconsistent with a Holmesian posture
because that posture permits judicial reversal of a majoritarian legislative preference in the
"clear constitutional mandate" situation. Yet no one regarded Brown as a "clear constitutional mandate".at the time it was decided. Indeed, one of the difficulties with Brown was
that the Court had interpreted the equal protection clause to permit segregation in the
public schools.
46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Id. at 481-82 (citation omitted).
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what the Lochner Court did for liberty of contract; namely, constitutionalize an extratextual right against the state. Douglas "declined," but actually accepted. Although Douglas throughout his
career denied this interpretation of his Griswold opinion, Griswold
elevated to constitutional stature a "liberty" of privacy, grounded
in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 48 Read in that
fashion, Griswold represents an advance from Brown. Griswold
was not merely a reaffirmation of the primacy of substantive rights
over majoritarianism; it also employed an openly extratextual interpretive methodology. In Brown, the Court's reading of the equal
protection clause had been doctrinally novel, but the Court was
not faced with the absence of any constitutional text pertaining to
equality of racial opportunity. In Griswold no text protecting "privacy" existed; only text protecting "liberties" existed and Holmesian canons of interpretation suggested that substantive readings
of the "liberties" text by judges was anti-majoritarian. Griswold
was, in short, a case in which the "right" given protection was derived extratextually, from cultural attitudes which took for granted
that married persons could make their own procreative decisions,
and a case in which the Court merely affirmed what "everyone"
already believed. It was a Marshallian opinion in a modernist
setting.
The last stage in the history brings us back to the Bork and
Kennedy nominations. This stage marks the establishment of the
neo-Marshallian posture as a genuine alternative to the Holmesian
posture, the appearance of "hard cases '49 for each of the two postures, and commentary seeking to reconcile the postures. Roe v.
Wade5" has been a classic "hard case" for neo-Marshallians. It
raises the problem of basing a jurisprudence on the primacy of
substantive rights when "rights" in constitutional adjudication

48. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a majority of the Court acknowledged that the
rights of privacy protected in Griswold and its progeny, such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972), were liberties protected by the due process clause. Id. at 152. In a
concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton, a companion case to Roe v. Wade, Justice Douglas
continued to maintain that Griswold had "nothing to do with substantive due process." 410
U.S. 179, 212 n.4 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. By "hard cases" I mean cases conceived as such by the prevailing jurisprudential discourse of the time, not cases that are inherently difficult.
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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may be historically contingent, philosophically problematic, and in
perceived conflict with other rights.
Conversely, a classic "hard case" for unreconstructed Holmesians is Bowers v. Hardwick.51 That decision seeks to distinguish
between a deeply embedded but not yet explicitly protected
right-the right for adults to engage in private consensual intimate
affection-and the "nonright" of adult homosexuals to engage in
private consensual sex. The decision affirms a majoritarian preference, namely that the state should prohibit private consensual homosexual activity because it is immoral or repulsive. In Bowers,
the Holmesian posture thus confronts the dilemma that the whims
of majorities with respect to our sexual preferences affect either
"all of us" or just homosexuals. If the latter view is preferable, the
decision affirms that majorities can repress private consensual intimate conduct simply on the basis of their preferences. This affirmation leads Holmesians back to the problem of the close relationship between majoritarianism and totalitarianism.
In response to "hard cases" such as Roe or Bowers, constitutional commentators have produced a new outpouring of literature
in the late 1970s and 80s. I have previously alluded to some of the
prominent examples of that literature, 52 but there are numerous
others. As early as the late 1960s, 53 commentators had exhibited an
awareness that the unreconstructed Holmesian and its neo-Holmesian versions, such as process theory, were being severely confronted by the Warren Court's neo-Marshalian tendencies. By the
mid-1970s, efforts to recreate and elevate the stature of substantive rights had appeared." As noted, the flood of commentary in

51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
52. See supra note 30.
53. See Black, supra note 29.
54. A prominent effort was Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703 (1975), in which the terms "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism" first appeared. Despite my admiration for Professor Grey's work, I continue to believe that the
rapid acceptance of his terminology has led to an obfuscation of the language of constitutional commentary. As Grey employs the terms, "interpretivists" are those whose chief characteristic is that they disclaim the possibility of extratextual sources for constitutional interpretation; "noninterpretivists" by contrast admit such a possibility. But because both the
"interpretivist" and "noninterpretivist" postures are theories of constitutional interpretation, both groups are "interpreters." I believe that the close connection between the words
"interpreter" and "interpretivist" has led to significant confusion, especially in the classroom. Although it is too late to abandon these terms, Grey could have avoided any confu-
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the late 1970s and 80s has stressed the renewal of substantive
rights in constitutional law, has opposed that renewal and offered
up unreconstructed and neo-Holmesian perspectives, and has
sought to reconcile the two positions.
III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF DISCOURSE

At this point we are in a position to revisit the jurisprudential
climate in which the Bork and Kennedy nominations occurred.
The history just reviewed suggests that the discourse of commentary up to the time of those nominations was an implicit dialogue
between Holmesians and Marshallians about the relationship between rights, the legislature, the Constitution, and the Court. In
the terms of this essay, the following questions have been at the
core of the debate: Is the Court to be a protector of rights based on
those substantive value judgments that while articulated by the
Justices, are deeply shared in the culture at large? Or is the Court
to concede implicitly that Justices are not capable, indeed that no
moderns are capable, of making a determination of which values
count more than others, of which values are universal, and of
which values are always to be given substantive priority?
In his confirmation hearings, Bork attempted to portray himself
as something of a Holmesian. He believed in judicial "self-restraint," in following the "original intent" of the framers, and in
majoritarian democracy.5 5 He would not be guided by his substantive views as a Justice; he would be guided by the text of the Constitution, the original intent of its framers, and the principle of
deference to majorities. Bork's self-portrait was simply not accepted as credible; it was labeled a "confirmation conversion."
Bork's opponents argued that he was not only an ideologue, but
that his ideological views were substantively "wrong": for example,
he had been on the "wrong" side of both of the central neo-Marsion had he used the terms "textual" and extratextual" because the necessity for constitutional interpreters to be bound by a finite constitutional text is at the heart of the dispute
between the two postures. Of course, "extratextual" may sound pejorative, which is perhaps
why Grey did not use it. It only sounds pejorative, however, if one is frozen in a jurisprudential perspective that insists that the "text" control constitutional interpretation. Grey's
views suggest that he is hardly "frozen" in that sense.
55. See Bork Statement: "Philosophy of Role of Judge," N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1987, at
A28, col. 1.

19881

THE DISCOURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

145

shallian decisions of the recent past, Brown and Griswold. Bork,
his critics claimed, had come to accept Brown, but his previously
expressed views on civil rights issues suggested that his was a belated and perhaps a convenient acceptance. He had never accepted
Griswold: he believed that privacy was not protected by the
Constitution.
Above all else, the substantive "extremism" of Bork's views was
the cause of the defeat of his nomination. National politics undoubtedly played a part; the Senate that confirmed Scalia as Associate Justice and Rehnquist as Chief Justice had a different composition from the Democrat-controlled Senate that failed to
confirm Bork. Yet that Senate confirmed Kennedy. Despite his impressive professional qualifications and the absence of any ethical
improprieties in his career, Bork's substantive views ultimately
provided the material for his defeat.
How could a person with Bork's professional credentials, who
advanced Holmesian and neo-Holmesian arguments that were for
the most part jurisprudential orthodoxies" e and who was nominated in a confirmation culture in which presidential prerogative
was still given great weight, fail to be confirmed? In the terms of
this essay, Bork's failure principally resulted from the fact that
those who passed on his confirmation believed that he was not
truly a Holmesian, but rather a neo-Marshallian masquerading as a
Holmesian, and found that his version of neo-Marshallianism was
substantively disqualifying for a Supreme Court Justice.
Saying that one disagrees with a nominee's substantive views,
and, for that matter, that one disagrees with the substantive views
of the nominating president, is quite a different statement than
saying that a nominee's views are so substantively wrongheaded as
to disqualify him or her for the Court. Yet the latter statement is
what a majority of the Senate said about Bork. The stark emergence of the orientation that a nominee's substantive views are de-

56. The interpretive canon of "original intent" may not qualify for the label "orthodoxy."
Although the adherence to the constitutional text has been an established canon of constitutional interpretation since Marshall, see G.E. WHITE, supra note 16, at 111-56, adherence to
the original intent of the framers, especially in some of its less apt contemporary versions,
appears to endorse a position so limiting to modem judges as to amount to a radically new
and incoherent theory of interpretation. For a sensible historical discussion, see Powell, The
Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:131

cisive in his or her eligibility, even those of a nominee with Bork's
professional qualifications, marks a new stage in the discourse of
commentary on the place of Supreme Court Justices in American
culture. In the Bork hearings the criterion of substantive ideology
was not merely juxtaposed against other traditional criteria such
as the presidential prerogative, the nominee disclaimer corollary
and the nominee's professional qualifications, substantive ideology
overwhelmed those criteria.
This brings me to Kennedy's successful confirmation. One might
be tempted to say that Kennedy was confirmed, and Bork was not,
because Kennedy successfully invoked the nominee disclaimer corollary, thereby implicitly convincing those passing on his nomination that his stance as a Justice would be that of a Holmesian. Yet
that interpretation would be a misreading of the two confirmation
proceedings. Kennedy and Bork both used the same orthodox language of "self-restraint" and fidelity to the Constitution,"7 but
Kennedy's prior record was principally scrutinized with respect to
the substantive political implications of his positions. He was ultimately deemed a "moderate"-a person with a conservative but
not ultraright ideology, the sort of individual that Reagan might be
expected to look favorably on but whose views were not "extreme."
He was acceptable to the Senate because of the content of his ideology. The two confirmation episodes thus can be viewed as conveying the same message that the substance of a nominee's views
overwhelms anything else about his or her candidacy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Bork and Kennedy hearings thus suggest that substantive,
rights-oriented jurisprudence is not merely competing with, but
encroaching upon the jurisprudence of majoritarian deference; the
dialogue between Holmesians and Marshallians may no longer be
in equipoise. The most fascinating aspect of this potential development is that in the face of a renewed emphasis on the substantive
ideology of Supreme Court Justices, the orthodox language employed to characterize the jurisprudential stances of those Justices
has apparently retained its vitality. In short, nominees and their
57. See Bork Statement, supra note 55; The Questions Begin: 'Who Is Anthony Kennedy?,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1987, at B16, col. 3.
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critics continue to treat judicial "self-restraint," the catchword of
Holmesian jurisprudence, as if it were a significant check on the
substantive inclinations of the nominees, while at the same time
treating substantive ideology as the decisive criterion in the selection of Justices.
This paradoxical situation has resulted, in my view, from a failure to distinguish two quite different features of the Holmesian
posture, with its homage to judicial "self-restraint." One feature is
the idea that judges can suppress their substantive views simply by
deferring to "neutral" authoritative legal sources, such as the Constitution, statutes, or precedent. Thus Holmes, in deciding the
Lochner case, suppresses his own views on labor relations because
the Constitution does not embody any economic theory, whether
paternalism or laissez faire.5 8 The other feature is the related but
distinguishable idea that judges can suppress their substantive
views by recognizing the overriding substantive commitment of the
Constitution, and American culture generally, to democracy and
pluralism, and by further recognizing that the only way to preserve
pluralism is by accepting the primacy of institutions-primarily
the legislature-that can incorporate multiple ideological
perspectives.
The first feature of Holmesianism is nonsensical, and has been
exposed so thoroughly as to no longer merit serious attention.
Judges cannot avoid substantive choices simply by following authoritative legal sources because those sources are not themselves
substantively neutral.5 9 Unfortunately, the first feature and the
second have been run together, to the detriment of the second. The
second feature remains a significant jurisprudential message today
if pluralism, the contemporary version of majoritarianism, is regarded as a significant cultural value. The strength of the second
message, combined with some unreflective adherence to the first,
accounts for the continued vitality of language subscribing to the
canons of judicial self-restraint.

58. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
59. Critics of Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, supra note
44, recognized this immediately. See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHL L. REv. 661 (1960).
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Yet even the second feature seems problematic. What if the institutional embodiments of pluralism do not preserve it? What if
the legislative process functions to exclude views, rather than to
include them? What if in deferring to majoritarian instructions
judges are making substanative choices, namely the choice to sustain the ideology of the majority? What if, in the end, the chief
restraint on judges is the content of their own substantive values,
so that constitutional adjudication imposes on judges an implicit
burden to convince others that the values they are affirming in a
given case are the values that the rest of the culture cares deeply
about? If such questions are real rather than rhetorical, then the
obligation of constitutional commentators would seem to be to
evaluate the Court's decisions from an unabashedly neo-Marshallian posture because substantive ideology is all that counts in those
decisions.
The primacy of substantive ideology in constitutional adjudication suggests that a good deal of allegedly sophisticated modernist
constitutional discourse is just rhetoric. It is rhetoric to the extent
that it fails to realize that whatever institutional or doctrinal devices one enacts to prevent substantive values from being paramount in constitutional adjudication, substantive values will shape
the devices being enacted. The Bork and Kennedy nominations
may have led to the beginning of a recognition of the overarching
significance of ideology in constitutional adjudication, a recognition that is by no means threatening, either to the Court or to the
rest of us. We have in a sense come full circle. We are back to
Marshall, but not, of course, with Marshall. Holmes is still with us
as well, and perhaps we may come to understand a little better
how he fits in.

